MALSINDO OPERATION AND PIRACY IN THE MALACCA STRAIT
Piracy is one of the few problems seafarers have faced since the onset of maritime travel. In the following essay, the author tries to examine the problem of Piracy in the Strait of Malacca. In the first section of the essay, the problem of piracy is understood within the broader framework of Maritime security by examining the subject matter of maritime security. Maritime security analysis is essential as piracy is not a standalone problem. It has to be situated within the broader aspect of national security and the economic aspect of maritime security. In the second section, piracy is analysed within the strait of Malacca, followed by analysing of measures taken to resolve the problem, such as MALSINDO operation, Malacca strait patrol and regional intelligence sharing.
MARITIME SECURITY AND THE SUBJECT MATTER
Maritime trade is one of the central veins of global supply chains, making maritime security a significant challenge to the international economy. With the rise of globalised trade, there has been a rise in the study of maritime security as a specific area of analysis within the security studies of international relations. Security is often defined as the primary function of the state. Thus the study of power has become the subject of international relations leading to various schools of thought, namely realist, liberal and constructivist approaches to security studies.
Historians like John Mack argue that seas are often viewed as areas of danger and insecurity throughout human history. Thus power is often expressed through the state’s ability to master the sea. Thus, the sea tends to be understood as the stage for geopolitical power projection, interstate warfare or militarised disputes, a source of specific threats such as piracy, or a connector between states that enables various phenomena from colonialism to globalisation.
International laws on Maritime trade have evolved from the concept of “freedom of the seas” given by Hugo Grotius in 1618 and the treaty of Westphalia to establishing the Maritime security organisation and the ocean law framework in 1982. Early modern history was often characterised by Maritime raiding by the colonial powers, which was the primary means for settling into the respective colonies. However, the era of free trade colonialism brought after 1815 led to the framing of various treaties which defined the terms of secure trade in the oceans. Thus, in 1948, various nations in Geneva agreed to set up Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, or IMCO, which changed to an International maritime organisation in 1982. Its primary objective was to facilitate cooperation and develop international Maritime law. Finally, the freedom of the seas was replaced by UNCLOS 1982, which became the world’s first collaborative legal framework dealing with marine and maritime activities. It replaced the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, which respectively dealt with territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the high seas, fishing and conservation of living resources on the high seas. It created three new institutions, namely the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Seabed Authority, and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Despite the regulatory framework, there are various challenges to Maritime security, which can broadly be explained through the following maritime security matrix. The challenge to the Marine environment is a global issue that deals with the issues of pollution, bleaching and climate change. The national security challenge is often fraught with competing power claims by the nation-states, as seen in the South China Sea and Malacca strait and the claims of non-state actors. This has even led to economic problems and trade losses due to piracy and trafficking. The human security challenge can be seen through the problems of unregulated migration and human trafficking. (ChristianBueger, 2015).
In the following section, the paper will primarily examine the maritime security threats in the Malacca strait ranging from maritime terrorism, piracy and trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods, followed by the measures taken to address them, such as antipiracy patrols, MALSINDO and Malacca strait protocol.
PIRACY AND THE MALACCA STRAIT
Piracy can be defined as an illegal act (let’s say robbery) on the high seas outside territorial waters (outside 12 nautical miles). Piracy is one of the major maritime security challenges in the Malacca Strait. It is one of the busiest shipping trade routes in the world, connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. Almost 40 % of the world trade takes place through the narrow strait making it a vital choke point in shipping routes. (Tharoor, 2014). Since the security of shipping routes from piracy is vital for international trade and crude oil supplies to China and East Asia, the three coastal states Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, who are responsible for security around the region, are assisted by the US, India, China and Japan in securing the region. The Strait is seen as a successful case in fighting the challenges of Piracy through naval diplomacy and maritime cooperation through initiatives like MALSINDO trilateral coordinated patrols, Malacca Straits Security Initiative (MSSI) and Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAPP).
Figure 1 The Strait of Malacca (Time,2005)
In the early 2000s, the Piracy attacks continued to rise as the coordinated patrols by Singapore and Indonesia failed to reduce the threats in the region. In the backdrop of this challenge and efforts of internationalisation of the issue by the USA to police the strait under the regional maritime security initiative (RMSI), Malaysia raised the issue of rights of littoral states leading to coordinated patrol initiative by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia also known as MALSINDO operations. The littoral states' trilateral coordinated anti-piracy ship patrols were an attempt to protect sovereignty by the regional littoral states, as reiterated in the Shangri-La Dialogue of 2005 and Batam joint declaration. The success of the MALSINDO Operation in combating piracy and armed robbery can be seen through the dropping of the Malaccan strait from the “war-risk area” in 2006 by Lloyd’s Joint War Risk Committee. As seen through the following graph, there has been a drastic reduction in piracy incidents after MALSINDO operations.
MALSINDO OPERATION
MALSINDO operation is a regional security measure in which littoral states of the strait agreed to conduct naval patrols in the region and share intelligence to reduce the incidents of piracy.
In an attempt to increase cooperation around the region, various cooperative measures were adopted by littoral states Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (in 2008) under Malacca strait patrols. It comprises the Malacca strait seas patrol (formerly MALSINDO) “Eyes-in-the-Sky” (EiS) Combined Maritime Air Patrols, as well as the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). Under IEG, the Malacca Straits Patrol Information System (MSP-IS) was developed comprising Open and Analyzed Shipping Information System (OASIS) and Sense-Making Analysis and Research Tool (SMART) (Sheet, 2015).
Thus, effective Maritime domain awareness through the information fusion centre in Singapore and naval diplomacy led to a drastic reduction in piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits. The cooperation by the states at the funnels of the strait, namely India and Thailand, has been central to ineffective regional cooperation in maritime security. India continues to conduct regular joint patrols with various regional states around the Bay of Bengal and Malacca strait.
Despite cooperation, the strait continues to face challenges due to accidents, disasters, an associated rise in piracy attacks, and the power struggle between the global powers in the region (Maritime silk route vs QUAD). (Collin, 2016)
Indian attempts to maritime cooperation in the Malacca strait are supported by Maritime domain awareness and information sharing between the states. However, India’s attempt to join the Malacca strait protocol has been opposed by Indonesia due to its historical opposition to external interference in the region.
In the report of Naval War College, Lt. Commander Jamiola explained the Malacca formulae for the success behind the MALSINDO operations and declining piracy attacks in the Strait of Malacca. He argues that since the littoral states have established stable functioning governments, it is easier to apply counter-piracy formulae of state-sponsored naval forces, regional intelligence sharing, surface surveillance radars, a court system and fighting the origins of piracy on land. (LCDR Donald R. Jamiola, 2009).
CONCLUSION
Thus, the MALSINDO operation and the following regional cooperation have effectively reduced piracy in the Strait of Malacca. However, challenges remain in the region as various non-state actors from unstable regions like Rakhine of Myanmar or the infamous Abu Sayyaf group of the Philippines could lead to further attacks. Preventive measures should be regularly taken in the form of information sharing, Joint patrols and ensuring access to better opportunities for the coastal communities to prevent the rise in the incidents of piracy.
India should deepen its relations with littoral states by its framework of regional maritime security “SAGAR” (Security and growth for all in the region) through adopting the idea of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region.
REFERENCES
ChristianBueger. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy, 159–164.
Collin, K. S. (2016). The Malacca Strait Patrols: RSIS Commentary.
LCDR Donald R. Jamiola, J. (2009). THE STRAIT OF MALACCA FORMULA: SUCCESS IN COUNTER-PIRACY. Naval War College.
Long, D. (2020, Dec). COVID-19 Could Spark a New Era of Piracy in Southeast Asia. The Diplomat.
Sheet, F. (2015). The Malacca Straits Patrol. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/.
Tharoor, I. (2014). Piracy is on the rise in the world’s most crucial shipping lane. Washington Post.
